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The paper establishes empirically the temporal causality and long run relationship 
between government expenditures and government revenues for the case of Guinea-Bissau - 
a low income country under stress (LICUS) in Africa. A macroeconomic model is developed 
to lay out the hypothesis of a spend-tax behavior in the country’s public finances 
management system. Empirical validation is carried out by means of a traditional 
Granger-causality test and the estimation of an error correction model between expenditures 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Fiscal policy is, in essence, a short-run issue, but that can have lasting 
macroeconomic consequences. In the debate about economic policy, fiscal policy is 
viewed as an instrument used to mitigate short-run fluctuations of output and 
employment and bring the economy closer to potential output (Zagler and Dürnecker 
(2003)). This can happen via changes in expenditures, revenues, or both. On the 
expenditure side, early models of endogenous growth considered some public 
expenditure categories as the engine of economic growth. For instance, in such 
framework, expenditures on public infrastructure, research and development, education 
and health can have a positive impact on growth (e.g., Barro (1990); Romer (1990); and 
Bloom et al. (2001)). On the revenue side, taxes can distort private agents’ decisions 
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with respect to factor accumulation and supply. As in the endogenous growth framework 
externalities are always present, distortionary taxation can internalize the effect of the 
externality in private decision rules, and thus induce the efficient allocation of resources 
(Turnovsky (1996)). 
In the short run, fiscal policy can be considered expansionary (contractionary) when 
public expenditures exceed (fall short of) public revenues and the resulting deficit can be 
interpreted as a means to finance additional government expenditures. If these 
expenditures are considered growth enhancing, then a government deficit exhibits an 
indirect effect on long-term economic growth. In a Ricardian world, however, where 
agents view the deficit simply as taxes delayed, there should be no difference between 
tax and deficit finance of government expenditures, as long as the tax structure remains 
unchanged in the future (Ludvigson (1996)). On the other hand, if the economy is 
non-Ricardian, due to credit constraints or overlapping generations, then public deficits 
can change the private incentives to accumulation and thus directly influence the rate of 
growth of the economy. As argued by Araújo and Martins (1999), running a 
debt-financed deficit can induce the government to absorb additional resources from the 
private sector, which could have been used instead for the accumulation of private 
physical capital. If the revenue raised in that fashion is spent in a less productive way 
than it would be by the private sector, the overall growth effect would be negative.   
This paper is concerned with the issue of the intertemporal relationship between 
revenues and expenditures and the way in which countries deal with the management of 
their public deficits. Different hypotheses can be considered to examine such problem. 
The so-called tax-spend hypothesis postulates that governments raise tax revenues ahead 
of engaging in new expenditures (Friedman (1978); Buchanan and Wagner (1978)). The 
spend-tax hypothesis, on the other hand, predicts that governments spend first and then 
increase tax revenues to finance their expenditures (Peacock and Wiseman (1979); Barro 
(1974)). There is also the fiscal synchronization hypothesis that suggests that 
governments take decisions about revenues and expenditures simultaneously (Musgrave 
(1966); Meltzer and Richard (1981)). Lastly, there is the possibility of independence as 
regards the decisions to spend and raise revenues (Baghestani and McNown (1994)).   
This issue has been investigated for a number of countries, but a consensus has not 
been reached about the nexus between government revenues and expenditures. Ewing 
and Payne (1998) have examined the case of five Latin American countries finding 
mixed results for the countries in their sample. Park (1998) looked at the case of Korea 
and found supporting evidence for the tax-spend hypothesis. The case of India has been 
recently examined by Dhanasekaran (2001) who found evidence in support of the 
spend-tax hypothesis. It is evident, therefore, that the question remains empirically 
unsettled. 
In what follows we test these hypotheses for the case of Guinea-Bissau - a 
low-income country under stress (LICUS) - and investigate possible long-run 
relationships between government expenditures and revenues using a simple error 
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usually emerging from a conflict experience, have limited capability of borrowing 
money domestically, and have enormous spending needs. Fiscal discipline and public 
finance management therefore are relevant issues in this context as they can have lasting 
effects in terms of resource allocation within the economy with long-run growth 
implications.  
After this Introduction, we develop a simple macroeconomic model (Sections 2 and 
3) that lays out the hypothesis that Guinea-Bissau conforms to the spend-tax hypothesis. 
Empirical validation of this hypothesis is carried out in Sections 4 and 5 by means of a 
traditional Granger-causality test and the estimation of a simple error correction model 
between expenditures and revenues, respectively. The conclusions appear in Section 6 
and point to policy recommendations to restore fiscal discipline in Guinea-Bissau.   
 
 
2.    THE  MODEL 
 
The economy of Guinea-Bissau is based on the primary sector which is specialized 
in the production   and  export    of cashew nuts:  ) (Y ) (X
 
X Y = α ,                                                           ( 1 )  
 
where  1 0 ≤ <α , without loss of generality, we assume  1 = α . 
As a poor country with an almost inexistent financial market [there is only one 
commercial bank in activity], with an economy based in the production of cashew nuts 
that increases extensively by allocating more land to increase production, we can assume 
that investments    are inelastic and independent of the interest rate, and savings   
being an increasing function of output:   
) (I ) (S
 
I I = ,                                                              ( 2 )  
 
) (Y S S= .                                                           ( 3 )  
 
The amount of cashew nuts exported increases with its international price   [that 
reflects supply and demand shocks], and with the income of the rest of the world  . 




) (π , defined as the price of foreign 
currency (CFA F. per U.S. Dollar), thus a rise in the exchange rate increases exports by 
making them cheaper: 
 
) , , ( π
f Y p X X = .                                                     ( 4 )  
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decreasing function of the exchange rate  ) (π : 
 
) , ( π Y Z Z = .                                                        ( 5 )  
 
The exchange rate is held fixed by the BCEAO, the independent central bank of the 
West African common market and monetary union [WAEMU]   
 
π π = .                                                             ( 6 )  
 
The Central Bank’s monetary policy objective is to guarantee price level stability 
and consequently low inflation. In order to achieve the price level stability objective the 
central bank uses a mixed policy of fixed interest rates and credit controls [aiming at 
achieving a stable velocity of circulation of money] to its state members: 
 
r r= ,                                                              ( 7 )  
 
M Y v / = ,                                                           ( 8 )  
 
where  r  is the interest rate, M  is the quantity of money,   is the velocity of 
circulation of money. Therefore, the money market equilibrium leads to the 
determination of the price level: 
v
 
) , ( r Y L
P
M
= .                                                        ( 9 )  
 
Concerning public finance, the government relies on three main sources of revenue 
: export and import taxes and fishing licenses    ) (T ) (l
 
l Z T X T T + + = ) ( ) ( .                                                 ( 1 0 )  
 
Due to lack of transparency, weak governance, rent seeking, corruption, 
management malpractices and inelastic demands for public services, government 
expenditures   are always above the level consistent with short term budget 
equilibrium 
) (G
) (G : 
 
G G≥ .                                                           ( 1 1 )  
 
The model above determines the equilibrium values of the following endogenous 
variables:  P S Z Y X I M r G , , , , , , , , , π  and T . It is block recursive, Equations (11), (7), GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES IN GUINEA-BISSAU  111
(6), (2) determine simultaneously the equilibrium values of  π , , r G  and  I  respectively. 
Then, given  π , Equation (4) determines the equilibrium value of exports  . Given 




Z , Equation (8) determines the quantity of money M  and Equation (3) 
determines savings  . Given  S M  and Y  Equation (9) determines the price level  P . 
Finally, given   and  Y Z , Equation (10) determines government revenues  T .  
r π
) T
Note the important role of the monetary policy set by the BCEAO in this model, 
since the interest rate    and the exchange rate   are determined by it independently 
of any other variables in the model. Another important characteristic of this model is that 
government expenditures   are determined ahead of government revenues ( . 
That is, for each period of time,   temporally precedes 
) (G
G T . Thus one can argue that 
government expenditures Granger-cause government revenues, which makes our model 
a simple macroeconomic version of the spend-tax hypothesis for the case of 
Guinea-Bissau. This is the hypothesis that we are going to test in the following section. 
 
 
3.  THE  GRANGER-CAUSALITY  TEST 
 
The methodology of the Granger-causality test can be briefly described as follows. If 
better predictions of a given series Y can be obtained by adding to lagged values of Y 
current and lagged values of another given variable X, then X is said to Granger-cause Y. 
That is, X is said to precede temporally Y in that changes in X take place first than 
changes in Y. Three other possible results are the cases of unilateral causality from Y to 
X, bi-directional causality (or feedback), and independence. It is important to notice 
however that temporal precedence does not imply a cause and effect relationship, but 
establishing the order of temporal precedence between two variables can be very useful 
to understand the nature of several economic problems. 
As noted by Park (1998), in a number of previous studies that investigated the issue 
addressed in this paper, important statistical properties of the data have not been taken 
into account when the Granger-Causality tests were implemented. These caveats may 
have contributed to inconsistent results. Seminal work by Granger and Newbold (1974) 
and Phillips (1986) casts doubt on empirical evidence based on regression analysis of 
time-series data given any nonstationary variables. Thus, to avoid the problem of the 
spurious regression and the failure to account for the appropriate dynamic specification, 
we first performed unit roots tests on our variables.   
The stationarity of the variables was tested by means of standard Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. As the power of these tests to 
distinguish between series that are purely non-stationary processes and those with near 
unit roots is limited, we have also run the KPSS (1992) test [see Kwiatowski et al. 
(1992)]. Contrary to the ADF type test the KPSS test has the null of stationarity. To 
determine the appropriate lag length of the tests, we used the Schwarz BIC model 
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ADF and PP tests do not allow for the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity 
for the levels of the variables with the reverse being observed for their first differences, 
while in the KPSS test we reject the null of stationarity for the levels of the variables but 
do not reject it for their first differences. Therefore, we conclude that our variables are 
integrated of the first order and we can then proceed with the simplest version of the 
Granger test using the variable in its stationary forms (i.e., their first differences) without 
incurring in the problem of the spurious regression. 
 
 
Table 1.    Unit Root Tests for Levels and First Differences of the   
Variables: 1981 to 2002 
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Notes: The lag length was chosen by selecting the lowest Bayesian Information Criterion for each variable. 




The results appear in Table 2 and were obtained with one lag for each variable. 
Using annual data for government expenditures and revenues over the period 1981 to 
2002, we have found unilateral causality from expenditures to revenues in Guinea-Bissau. 
The same exercise was carried out for the case of government expenditures and grants and 
the results remained unchanged.   
 
 
Table 2.    Granger-Causality Tests for Expenditures and Revenues: 1981 to 2002 
Hypothesis Test  Statistic  Conclusion 
Expenditures Granger-Cause Revenues  t-prob = 0.720  Do Not Reject 
Revenues Granger-Cause Expenditures    t-prob = 0.069  Reject 
 
 
4.    THE ERROR CORRECTION MODEL 
 
We now assess potential long-run behavior and the short-run dynamics of 
expenditures and revenues in Guinea-Bissau. Since we have found that the variables are 
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logs of expenditures and revenues to assess their long-run behavior and then we run a 
simple error correction model using the first differences of the variables to infer about 
their short-run dynamics.
1  The long-run cointegrating vector is estimated with revenues 
as the dependent variable, as we have found unilateral causality from expenditures to 
revenues in Guinea-Bissau: 
 
) 163 . 0 ( ) 155 . 0 ( ) 558 . 0 (
52 . 0 08 . 1 49 . 0 t t t û War G Log T Log + − + − =
.                             ( 1 6 )  
 
For this equation, the key statistics were consistent with a well specified time series 
model (R
2 = 0.73 and DW = 1.71), and the residuals were found stationary ruling out the 
null hypothesis of spurious regression. The unit coefficient on government expenditures 
(G) confirms existence of cointegration between the two variables while the negative 
coefficient for the dummy variable (War - that assumed the value of 1 for 1998-99 and 0 
otherwise) confirms the negative impact of the conflict that plagued the country between 
1998 and 1999. 
For the short-term dynamics we have estimated the following model: 
 
t t t t t War T G G T ε ϕ δ β α + + − + ∆ + = ∆ − − ) ( 1 1 ,                              ( 1 7 )  
 
Where,  β , the coefficient of the contemporaneous change in G  )  seizes the 
short-term effects while 
( t G ∆
δ , the error correction coefficient, incorporates feedback in the 
relationship between T  and  . The coefficient  G α  is the intercept and   is an 
error term with zero mean, and “War” is a vector of bivariate (0,1) dummy variables to 
control for periods of recession and war. The error correction term is represented by the 
residuals of the cointegrating vector (Equation 16) lagged one period  . The results 
for the error correction model with the variables both in levels and in logs are shown in 
Table 3.   
t ε
) ( 1 - t û
The estimated error-correction coefficient is negative and highly significant in both 
models, confirming the existence of a stable long-run relationship between government 
expenditures and revenues in Guinea-Bissau. At any given time t, when the government 
deficit has overshot in the previous period t  as  ), ( 1 1 1 − − > − t t T G , 0 < δ  the error 
correction term works to push   back towards the equilibrium. G
2 The high absolute 
value of the error-correction term means that the adjustment is very fast. In the case of 
the model with the variables in levels, roughly 75% of any deviation from long run 
equilibrium is made up in a year; in the case of the log-model, the adjustment is of 87% 
in the same year. The coefficient of the contemporaneous change of   is positive in  G
 
1 For simplicity, we consider an ECM that does not include the lags of   and  .  t G ∆ t T ∆
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both cases confirming the spend-tax hypothesis. In the log-model, this coefficient was 
positive and greater than 1 pointing to the fact that the effort to generate revenues after 
each dollar spent is more than proportional. One other possible explanation is concerned 
with the inefficiency of public spending and the associated difficulty to increase tax 
revenues in Guinea-Bissau. That is, lack of control of public spending and an overall 
weak institutional framework governing public financial management imply that the 
government must raise more than one dollar in revenues to match an equivalent 
expenditure. 
In light of these findings, one can safely conclude that Guinea-Bissau follows the 
“spend-tax” scheme, and that there exists a stable long-run relationship between 
government expenditures and revenues. The “spend-tax” hypothesis means that the 
government seems to spend first and then raise tax revenues and/or request/receive 
grants to finance its expenditures, rather than adopting the approach of raising funds first 
to finance spending later. Under this scenario, the government of Guinea-Bissau should 
try to control spending in order to restore fiscal discipline and control the size of its 
public deficit, in the short-run. 
 
 
Table 3.    OLS Estimates of the Error Correction Model 1981-2002   
Dependent Variable:  t T ∆  


























2    84%   86% 
Durbin-Watson 1.7  1.6 
Prob(F-stat.) 0.0  0.0 
Number of obs.  21  21 
Notes: ∆ denotes the first difference of the variable. In the levels model, the error correction term was derived 
from a long-run model (not reported but available upon request) with the variables in levels. Standard Errors 
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5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Fiscal policy is a short-run issue that can have long-run growth implications. Within 
the framework of endogenous growth models, for example, fiscal deficits can impact 
long-term growth positively if they are used to finance growth enhancing expenditures 
on, for instance, public infrastructure, research and development, education and health. 
On the other hand, if economic agents are non-Ricardian due to credit constraints and 
overlapping generation, public deficits can have a negative impact on long-term growth 
as public deficits can hamper growth by competing with private physical capital for 
individual savings.   
In this paper, we have assessed the intertemporal relationship between government 
expenditures and revenues for the case of Guinea-Bissau - a low income country under 
stress that has struggled to achieve fiscal discipline. Understanding this relationship is 
relevant as it can shed light on the way the government interferes in the allocation of 
resources in the economy. The underlying hypothesis of the paper is that government 
expenditures are determined ahead of government revenues, which is known in the 
literature as the spend-tax hypothesis.   
To achieve this objective, we have first presented a simple macroeconomic model 
outlining the postulated relationship between government expenditures and revenues in 
Guinea-Bissau. Using annual data for government expenditures and revenues over the 
period 1981 to 2002 and modern time series econometric techniques we were unable to 
reject the spend-tax hypothesis. The results suggest that while government expenditures 
and revenues exhibit a stable relationship in the long run, there exists unilateral causality 
from expenditures to revenues in Guinea-Bissau. That is, although the risk of budget 
deficit explosion in the long-run is limited, the government seems to spend first and then 
raise tax revenues and/or request/receive grants to finance its expenditures, rather than 
adopting the approach of raising funds first to finance spending later.   
The policy recommendation for Guinea-Bissau can be summarized as follows. In 
order to achieve fiscal sustainability the government should try to face up the 
implication of policies up to this point. In a first moment, government expenditures 
should be re-examined with the view to assess (i) their contribution to an efficient 
allocation of resources within the economy and (ii) their potential to finance growth 
enhancing spending categories (such as, for example, those considered in the framework 
of endogenous growth models - i.e., infrastructure, research and development, education, 
and health). In a second moment, the government should seek ways to re-order the 
intertemporal relationship between expenditures and revenues in a way consistent with 
the country’s revenue mobilization potential. This could pave the way for a sound 
medium-term budgeting framework and help the government to control its expenditures 
rather than increasing its fiscal revenues, thus reestablishing fiscal discipline without 
jeopardizing the accumulation of factors and affecting the country’s long-term growth 
potential. 
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